Securing Internet Routing - The Puzzle Pieces#
ZANOG@iWeek 2026 digest Program Core pick 21–23 April 2026
Tashi Phuntsho
- Why: Route leaks and hijacks are the systemic risk of the interdomain routing system, and this is the program's main survey of the defense stack — squarely in the intersection of network security and BGP internals. Worth the PM's time as a structured view of how the pieces (origin validation, path validation, filtering) do and don't compose.
- What: A review of the full routing-security toolkit — RPKI, Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs), BGPsec, IRR-based filtering, and emerging proposals — examining how the pieces fit together, where each excels, and the practical and organisational challenges blocking universal adoption (from abstract only).
- How: Mechanism-by-mechanism comparison: cryptographic origin validation via RPKI/ROAs against misorigination, IRR route objects for prefix filtering at AS boundaries, BGPsec for AS-path integrity, and newer proposals for leak detection — against a frank accounting of why adoption remains partial despite mature tooling.
- Where applicable: Broadly applicable to any network announcing or accepting BGP routes; vendor-neutral and global in scope despite the regional venue. A 30-minute slot, so expect survey depth rather than new results. Pairs naturally with the ASPA session immediately before it.