When UK Traffic Takes an Unplanned Detour: Routing Security for the UK Peering Community#

Ritesh Mukherjee (Nokia)

• Why: Routing security is core network security, and this is the program's substantive treatment: it moves past RPKI-ROV checklists to the attack classes ROV cannot see, grounded in real incidents (the 2019 Swiss leak of 70,000 routes via China Telecom Frankfurt; the 2025 BGP hijack disrupting DNS root infrastructure; documented "stealthy" hijacks that pass all RPKI checks).
• What: A practical, prioritised roadmap for UK peering networks: what LINX and LONAP route-server RPKI filtering already protects against; where bilateral (non-route-server) peers remain exposed; an introduction to ASPA, which all five RIRs have committed to supporting by end-2026; and the case for BMP as the missing observability layer that turns silently discarded invalid routes into active threat intelligence (from abstract only — the event page reproduces the abstract).
• How: A layered defence model: ROV on route servers (deployed), ROV on bilateral sessions (gap), ASPA for path-manipulation and valley-free enforcement (emerging), BMP-driven route monitoring for anomalies invisible to both ROV and ASPA (observability gap).
• Where applicable: Any network that peers. The framing is UK/LINX-specific but the ROV → ASPA → BMP maturity ladder is universally applicable, and the "quick wins this quarter" structure makes it actionable. Speaker is from Nokia, but the content is standards-based rather than product-based.