A comprehensive analysis of the IRR landscape#

Stavros Konstantaras (AMS-IX)

• Why: IRR (Internet Routing Registry) data is still what most networks generate route filters from, and its well-known staleness/inconsistency is a routing-security hygiene problem that also affects RPKI deployment. A comprehensive analysis — with the program having no abstract — suggests a data study across registries (RIPE, RADB, ARIN, etc.): freshness, coverage vs. RPKI, hijack-attributable errors. That's evidence, not anecdote — the kind of cross-environment content the PM should watch.
• What: A landscape-scale analysis of IRR data quality and coverage, from AMS-IX (which has both exchange-point visibility and a public IRR mirror) (program text only).
• How: Unknown; presumably registry-scraping and cross-correlation of route/route6 objects against observed announcements and/or RPKI ROAs.
• Where applicable: Any operator that uses IRR-derived filters (near-universal). The findings should be broadly applicable; note AMS-IX's vantage point means analysis is anchored on the European exchange ecosystem.