BitSquatting... ...or the infinite monkeys theorem...#

Warren Kumari, Google LLC

• Why: A weird, memorable, and real attack class: hardware bit-flips during DNS resolution silently redirect traffic to attacker domains one binary bit away — with live capture data showing what actually leaks.
• What: An update on 2011-era bitsquatting research: register domains one bit-flip away from popular names (microsont.com, googneapis.com, cxase.com...) and collect the traffic that hardware errors (cosmic rays, contaminated ceramics — the talk traces this back to 1970s DRAM and cites Qantas Flight 72) accidentally send you.
• How: A ~1-month capture across registered variants gathered ~54,000 requests, including expanded hostnames (msdn.microsont.com), SNI of legitimate domains, cookies, OAuth-style login URLs, executables, and JavaScript — each request proving a memory error happened somewhere and leaking what the affected host was doing.
• Where applicable: Mostly relevant as threat-model awareness for security teams and a reminder that DNS is a hardware-reliability observation channel; the "register typos-at-the-bit-level" strategy is trivially cheap for attackers and nearly impossible to fully defend.