DDoS Threatscape and Mitigation Strategies#

Kevin Richardson — NTT DATA

• Why: DDoS is the most operationally concrete part of the PM's network-security interest, and this is the only dedicated DDoS session on the program. NTT's global network sits in the middle of a large share of internet attack traffic, so an update on the current threatscape is worth the time.
• What: An overview of the current DDoS landscape and mitigation practice, from a provider with global visibility. The title and the one-word framing are all the program provides; there is no abstract, so the balance between attack trends (volumetric, protocol, application-layer, and the recurring amplification vectors) versus mitigation tactics (scrubbing, flow-spec, anycast absorption) is unknown. (from abstract only; no description published)
• How: Unknown in detail from the program. Talks in this genre typically combine attack telemetry with tiered mitigation: upstream flow control (BGP Flowspec, RTBH), dedicated scrubbing centers, and edge rate/application filtering.
• Where applicable: Broadly applicable — DDoS threatscape and mitigation patterns transfer across any operator facing the public internet. Mitigation economics scale with provider size; NTT-scale scrubbing capacity is not replicable by a small operator, but the defensive taxonomy is.