IXP+ based observations on peering and routing changes after Middle East cable outages#

Kaj Kjellgren and Bernd Speiss (DE-CIX)

• Why: A physical-layer failure with measurable routing consequences — exactly the kind of concrete postmortem that transfers across environments. Relevant to anyone whose traffic depends on intercontinental cable paths.
• What: Observations from DE-CIX data of trends and changes in routing and traffic after the cable cuts near the shore of Yemen in September, explicitly framed as do's and don'ts for routing setup, with the authors arguing the findings hold globally. (from abstract only)
• How: IXP-side analysis of traffic volumes, route announcements, and peering behavior before and after the cuts — who rerouted successfully, who lacked alternate paths, and what the shifts revealed about regional routing setups.
• Where applicable: The specific observations are tied to the Middle East corridor and DE-CIX's vantage points (single-IX perspective), but the resilience lessons — path diversity, alternate peering, routing hygiene under failure — apply to any operator with intercontinental dependencies.